• Analyzing over 1.1 million corporate assets, I find that assets of politically connected firms are significantly more likely to incur damage during social protests. I further document how these firms respond: during protests, they obscure their political ties, and afterward, they insure additional assets, expand coverage on existing policies, and, in some cases, dismiss their politician managers.
with Kristoph Kleiner
• Analyzing a proprietary dataset of over 200,000 corporate loans, we find that incumbent politicians in developing economies constrain financing for automation technologies to advance their political careers. Our findings suggest that politically motivated bank lending distorts firms' technology adoption decisions, revealing a novel mechanism through which political incentives hinder economic growth.
with Ankit Kalda
• While the benefits of banking relationships for firms are well-documented, how firms initially form these relationships remains less understood. Using a proprietary dataset of corporate loans matched with a resume database, we find that firms without a borrowing history tend to hire commercial bankers and improve their prospects of securing a first bank loan. This initial loan often establishes a lasting banking relationship that continues even after the hired banker departs from the firm.
• This paper examines the relationship between corporate social responsibility (CSR) and managers' personal prosocial behavior, showing that they act as partial substitutes. This finding supports the view that CSR is a form of insider-initiated corporate philanthropy, carrying important implications for CSR policy-making.
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